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Over the last few years, the international community has focused much of its attention on 
political developments in the Muslim world. In particular, the issue of the absence of 
democracy in much of the area has been at the centre of both academic and policy-
orientated debate. After the end of the Cold War, many believed that authoritarian 
regimes worldwide would quickly disappear to be replaced by western-style liberal 
democracies and, indeed, this trend seemed to hold true for some time. The successful 
processes of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America justified this early 
enthusiasm and contrary to popular belief, the Muslim world itself has not been immune 
from this greater push for democratization. Regimes across the Muslim world have had to 
contend with liberalizing and democratizing pressures coming both from within and from 
without. This is confirmed by the fact that even before Eastern European countries 
decisively moved towards greater democratization, Tunisia and Algeria were already 
experimenting with democratic reforms.1  
 In spite of these encouraging early trends, results in terms of actually successful 
democratic transitions have been largely disappointing and very few countries in the 
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Muslim world, and in particular in the Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA), can 
today be considered successful democracies.2 Due to these poor results, scholars and 
policy-makers have concentrated their attention on the causes for the absence of 
substantial democratic reforms in those parts of the world. This debate has generated a 
number of very different answers to the question of the failure of democratization in the 
Muslim world.3 To complicate the issue further it is also the case that these answers are 
given at a time where political Islam is presented in some academic and policy-making 
quarters as a global challenger to the western political, economic and social hegemony. In 
this context, one of the most conspicuous (if not altogether very new) answers to the 
supposed absence of democracy in the Muslim world is directly linked to the regressive 
and authoritarian precepts of Islam as a system of beliefs and social organisation.4 From 
this perspective, the Muslim world is presented as a monolithic entity incapable of 
dealing with the requirements of modernity – and most particularly liberal democracy – 
and responsible for generating an atmosphere of violence targeting ‘infidels’ both within 
and outside the Muslim world. Evidently, once one begins to think of democracy and 
Islam as fixed categories that are necessarily in opposition with each other, this approach 
vitiates a priori the possibility to think of the two as being capable of speaking to and 
influencing each other in a positive manner.5 But at the same time, such grand cultural 
explanations do provide a parsimonious explanation of the noted difficulties of 
democratization in the great majority of Muslim countries. Indeed, one can legitimately 
ask whether it would still make sense to analyse a region such as the ‘Muslim world’ if 
one were to abandon those grand cultural schemes. In this collection, we will attempt to 
do just that by pointing out that there is a ‘Musli
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defined or, at the very least, analytically posited for the sake of a better understanding of 
the contemporary political processes of democratization.  
 
This collection proposes to shift the focus away from grand culture-based 
explanations of democratization in the Muslim world, while retaining political Islam as 
its defining characteristic in the current socio-historical context. We suggest that this 
analytical distinction is practical and meaningful in the context of the study of 
democratization because a key factor of change in all those polities is the role played by 
Islamist parties or movements – be it directly through challenging the powers-that-be or, 
indirectly, through the counter-measures that are preventively put in place by incumbents 
to keep them out of office. To be sure, the agency of Islamist movements is but one of the 
factors that contribute to creating the democratizing dilemmas of the Muslim world. Yet 
it is the one strategic factor that is specific to this region of the world and, other things 
been equal, it constitutes the Muslim world as a set of polities with a common political 
developmental drive, even when the considerable differences among these movements 
are taken into account. We are fully aware of the self-reflexivity of this argument; and in 
particular the fact that such a perspective is relevant to the analysis of democratization in 
the Muslim world today because of the tendency and willingness of political players 
worldwide to view these Islamist movements as the main negative determinant of the 
problem (with all the implications that it may have as a self-fulfilling prophesy).6  
For analytical purposes we seek to separate the practical role played by Islamist 
movements as institutional actors for political mobilisation from the more diffuse cultural 
and religious underpinnings of social mobilisation. In other words, we leave aside the 
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meta-questions over Islam and democracy to be able to better explain the practical 
dilemmas of political Islam and democratization. As Daniel Brumberg pointed out, ‘the 
challenge is not to figure out whether Islamism is ‘essentially’ democratic versus 
autocratic, or liberal versus illiberal. Instead, it is to see whether this or that Islamist 
group is acting within a hegemonic political arena where the game is to shut out 
alternative approaches, or else within a competitive – let's call it dissonant – arena where 
Islamists, like other players, find themselves pushed to accommodate the logic of power-
sharing.’7 Needless to say that what is true of Islamist movements is also true of the 
secularised nationalist elites (and the military) that hold the reins of power in so many 
countries of the region and, to some extent, it is also true of the liberal forces in the 
Muslim world who are quite unsure themselves of the level of liberalism and democracy 
that they can afford to promote.8  
At one level of analysis, only the political players themselves can provide an 
answer to the abovementioned dilemma, as they come to grip with the process of political 
change. The study of democratization may only have yielded relative few insights for the 
Muslim world so far but the one finding whose relevance remains highly relevant is that 
it is through the very process of democratizing the polity that one can promote the 
collective learning of democratic ways of solving political problems.9 This collection 
contributes to this debate by examining the global reach of Islamist and democratic 
politics and by presenting country-specific studies of some of the most relevant Muslim 
polities of the post-Cold War and post-September 11 era. By analysing the tactical 
choices that are made in those countries, one can better understand which strategic 
orientations are not only theoretically possible but practically relevant. Our objective is to 
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avoid creating an artificial comparative framework that would aggregate as many 
putative causal factors of democratization in the Muslim world as possible in order to 
assess which ones are the most relevant. To be sure, such frameworks have their merits 
but since every process of democratisation is, in the end, unique, we emphasise here a 
more nominalist approach to the issue of the political dilemmas of democratization. This 
approach has the added advantage of not presenting polities as being at odds with theory, 
but rather theory as being ‘at odds’ with the ‘real world’. Indeed, note the conundrum 
encountered in the sophisticated comparative analysis of democratic consolidation 
proposed by Schneider and Schmitter: ‘we should not anticipate that autocratic regimes 
would be able to sustain political liberalization over extensive time periods. Yet, this is 
precisely what we found in our sample of MENA countries’.10  The case studies suggest a 
more practical way of looking at the complex issue of democratization by examining how 
seemingly contingent causal mechanisms fostered (or derailed) a democratizing synergy 
in those countries, and by outlining the rationale for the emergence of such typical 
situations. 
In particular, the collection aims to clarify three key issues of the debate on 
democratization in the Muslim world.  
First of all, it stresses the malleability of Islamic discourses and political 
movements in the face of changing opportunities for democratisation as well as the 
reconfiguration of authoritarian regimes in the face of changing dilemmas of political 
liberalization. It indicates that such changes in the dominant political positions (or 
positions which claim to be dominant) take place within a complex and usually global 
debate about what democracy and Islam ought to be. Within the parameters set by this 
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formal debate, democratization like Islamization are the more mundane processes which 
aim at reconciling everyday social and political practices with the kind of institutions and 
practices that the demos and the faithful would like to have. 
Secondly, this collection explores how institutional arrangements (including co-
optation of the opposition) put in place by authoritarian incumbents utilise the procedures 
and the discourse of democracy to strengthen their own arbitrary rule.11 In particular it 
indicates that processes like democratization and Islamization are not incrementally 
bringing people nearer to some pre-defined political order, that is, liberal democracy or 
Islamic democracy principally. Rather, it suggests that there is a narrowing of the gap 
between everyday experiences and political expectations; with all the well-known 
problems that this situation can generate (for example, the happy slave or, more 
commonly, the disenchanted voter). 
Thirdly, the studies investigate the relationship between political violence and 
democratisation. While incumbent regimes may (and usually do) invoke their role of 
custodians of the state to use their ‘monopoly of legitimate violence’ to control the 
process of political liberalization, the non-institutionalised forms of direct action 
available to non-state players are more idiosyncratic and opportunistic. These two modes 
of violence interact not only directly between themselves but also via proxy through the 
democratization process (or its failure thereof). In this context, a democratization process 
whose end result ought to be the actual handing over of state power to democratically 
chosen social actors can be subordinated to the need for the securitisation of the state as 
an institutional asset to be secured against the (actual and potential) hazard of any 
handover of power.  
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The collection opens with a review of the recent trends in the analysis of 
democratization in the Middle East region. Ray Hinnebusch sheds a much-needed light 
on the past mistakes of various brands of democratization hypotheses, applied to a 
Middle Eastern context. Most often these theoretical models have been at fault due to an 
excessive linearity and quest for parsimony in their explanation. They have painted the 
problems of democratization (and liberalization and development) with such broad 
brushstrokes that alternative forms of political development where simply not adequately 
considered. Thus, more than a Middle Eastern or Muslim exceptionalism, the non liberal-
democratic regimes in the region illustrated which viable political models could also 
ensure relative stability. While coercion is certainly part of the explanation, Hinnebusch 
points out that it is important not to simply analyse the repressive apparatus available to 
authoritarian elites to account for the robustness of authoritarianism. He suggests that 
there is a need to study Middle Eastern and North African societies in much greater detail 
because ‘authoritarianism persists in the Middle East in part because an accumulation of 
conditions are hostile to democratization; but also because such forms of governance as 
populist authoritarian and rentier monarchies represent modernised forms of 
authoritarianism which come out of and are congruent with indigenous societies. They 
are, moreover, adapting to the increased modernization of their societies through 
experiments with liberalised autocracy or pseudo-democracy.’   
Our first two cases studies of the process of democratization in the Muslim world 
highlight a rather optimistic scenario as they focus on countries outside the Greater 
Middle East where we have witnessed some promising democratic developments in 
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recent years. The contributions of Douglas Webber and Ben Thirkell-White on, 
respectively, Indonesia and Malaysia analyse how quite successful steps toward 
democratization have been made with the contribution of Islamist political actors. The 
success of Indonesia and Malaysia is obviously only partial and by no means irreversible, 
but it contributes to question deeply held assumptions about the relationship between 
political Islam and democratic advances. Far from proving to be the key determinant in 
the sequencing and the configuration of democratic reforms, the specifically religious 
dimension of the Islamist movements has not propelled these movements in a situation of 
opposition to other political actors. The socio-economic and political circumstances that 
were those of Indonesia and Malaysia in recent years have facilitated the emergence of a 
working consensus on governance between varied political constituencies – a consensus 
to which political actors have had to adjust regardless of their political preferences. The 
type of ‘democracy’ achieved in the two countries seems to indicate that the Muslim 
world does not suffer from a separate ‘disease’ regarding the inability to put in place 
consensual political and social structures, but suffers instead from the rather unoriginal 
shortcomings and difficulties that plague most of the developing world. To be sure, 
although Malaysia and Indonesia appear to be moving in the right direction – in the sense 
that they are palpably less authoritarian than they were before – they are still confined to 
a situation that is to some extent that of a ‘democracy with adjectives’ (such as semi-
democracy, liberalized autocracy, pseudo-democracy, and so on.).12  
It would be naïve to conceive democratization in the Muslim world as a linear 
teleological process. Whatever may be true of the emerging democratic institutions of 
Malaysia and Indonesia today, nothing guarantees that the remaining authoritarian 
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aspects of these polities will slowly disappear to make way for a recognisably liberal 
democratic system. Nor should we assume that those countries are in some ways 
necessarily leading the way in the political transformations taking place in the rest of the 
Muslim world. In fact, despite recent statements regarding an Arab democratic ‘spring’, 
as soon as one moves to analyse the MENA region, the picture that emerges is one of the 
persistence of authoritarianism; although it may not the same type of authoritarianism 
that was witnessed a couple of decades ago.13 It is therefore worthwhile outlining what, 
beyond coercion, can allow and facilitate the persistence of authoritarianism in the 
Middle East and North Africa and how contemporary authoritarianism can operate to 
prevent existing challengers from defeating it. As some regimes have become very 
skilled at the game of survival in the face of domestic and international pressures for 
democratisation, it is crucial to understand the procedures and mechanisms through 
which they are able to win this game. Thus, while Thirkell-White’s and Weber’s papers 
examined the ‘bright’ side of democratization, the analyses of Algeria and Jordan by, 
respectively, Frédéric Volpi and Ellen Lust-Okar, focus on its darker side. 
In his analysis of Algeria, Frédéric Volpi details very clearly how a pseudo-
democratic model works and how an authoritarian-inclined regime is able to deflect 
attention from its practices by pretending to be playing the game of electoral 
competitiveness. Using the 2004 electoral context as a paradigmatic example, Volpi 
outlines how the Algerian regime is able to pre-empt veritable change through a strategy 
of state-managed electoral process combining pre-selection of candidates, media control 
and vote-fixing. All this, rather than habituating political actors and citizens to the 
procedures of democracy leaves the polity with an empty-shell democracy that merely 
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formalises and institutionalises the rupture between civil and political society and the 
state system. Although these practices are currently able to keep the situation under 
control in Algeria after the spate of violent and arbitrary rule that characterised the 
country during the recent the Islamist insurrection, they also ensure that ‘the legitimacy 
of democracy as a concept and system of governance in the country and in the region is 
slowly but surely being eroded’.  
The in-depth examination of Jordan, often considered to be rather advanced on 
the road to democracy by regional standards, highlights some of the same problems that 
Volpi raised with regards to the legitimacy of democratic procedures in a context where 
effective policy-making does not reside with elected representatives. Ellen Lust-Okar 
points out that elections should not be so easily dismissed even when taking place in an 
authoritarian regime because the elites take them quite seriously and do see a purpose in 
holding them. Thus, there is the need to study them and to analyse where their relevance 
lies, as there is a very substantial effort from the regime in organising electoral 
competitions. The need for some sort of popular legitimacy is therefore present across the 
whole region and points to the fact that the notion of ‘rule by popular consensus’ is 
indeed present and incumbents feel some pressure in conforming to this requirement. The 
problem of authoritarianism is therefore not really linked to the absence of the ideas of 
consensual rule and popular mandate, but to the policy-making aspect of governing. In 
Jordan, the real wielders of power (the Palace) have so far been able to maintain 
exclusive control over policy-making by institutionally marginalising the democratic 
procedures they set in place and this is where their strength lies. There is very little doubt 
that there is ‘evidence that electoral institutions in authoritarian regimes can help to 
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stabilize these regimes’ and this further undermines the very concept of democracy as an 
alternative political order, as Lust-Okar convincingly argues.  
This erosion of the legitimacy of the discourse and process of democratization 
however is not simply the result of domestic political arrangements, but is also the 
outcome of flawed international – or ‘western’ after 1991 – policies in the region. By 
supporting a host of authoritarian regimes and by lauding their ‘electoral’ competitions 
without questioning where real power actually lies, the international community further 
undermines the positive connotations of democracy. For example, in the case of the 1991 
Algerian elections, western actors could hardly contain their relief when the Algerian 
Liberation Army carried out a military coup to stop an Islamist party from gaining power 
via the ballot box.14 It is an obvious truism that democratic transitions do not occur in a 
political vacuum and what takes place on the international stage has internal 
repercussions. Indeed, most of the nation-states analysed in this volume have been shaped 
or even created by the processes of colonisation and decolonisation, while the regimes’ 
orientations during the second half of the twentieth century have been heavily influenced 
by the dynamics of the Cold War. What is peculiar about the contemporary context is that 
powerful external actors explicitly advocate the promotion of democracy. The problem 
with this external agency is that it is not entirely clear how the moral and practical 
imperative of aiding democratic change competes with other, more pragmatic and 
material, concerns of the foreign policy of those international players – and particularly 
‘security’ after 9/11.15 In practice, the outcome of such a clash of interests is usually the 
implementation of a foreign policy that falls short of its stated objectives – most notably 
in its continuing support of regimes that do not respect democracy. And when dramatic 
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actions such as the invasion of Iraq are linked to arguments about spreading democracy in 
the Middle East, there are widespread suspicions about hidden agenda in western policies 
– suspicions that play in the hands of radical elements equating western-led 
democratisation with imperialism. 
In her contribution, Beverley Milton-Edwards analyses the impact of the US-UK 
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Islamisation of the political scene. This outcome is 
not one that the leaders of the ‘coalition’ necessarily expected, and it left the ‘coalition’ in 
a very uneasy situation about the steps to take regarding the future Iraqi domestic 
political and legal structures. The current debate within Iraq on the role of Islam re-
emphasises once more how the political process rather than ideological ‘second-guessing’ 
will influence how Islamist actors will behave, and whether Iraq is destined to be a liberal 
democracy, some other kind of democracy, or no democracy at all. This account also 
stresses how the international dimension of democratization might be decisive in 
determining the institutional fate of a country, but it also makes a strong case for this 
external intervention to be more ‘subtle’. It indicates that while military intervention 
successfully removed one kind of authoritarian order, it did little to introduce the 
citizenry to the workings of a meaningful and functioning pluralistic system of 
governance. By relying on selected secularised Iraqi exiles on the one hand and 
informally institutionalising the role of the Shi’a religious hierarchy on the other hand, 
the provisional authority and its sponsors effectively allowed old interests groups to 
‘reinforce pre-existing and rigid notions of power.’ Thus, Milton-Edwards suggests that 
only ‘if the process of democratization in Iraq can become part of the locally driven 
reconstruction agenda through acculturation rather than direct export, then ‘faith in 
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democracy’ as expressed in the rich and varied discourse that has emanated within the 
Muslim world for over a century may become possible.’  
The relevance of international factors, particularly in the shape of trans-national 
Islamic links, is especially visible in countries located at the periphery of the Muslim 
world where Muslims often do not constitute a majority of the population. Jeff Haynes’s 
account of the role of Muslim communities in East Africa illustrates well how Islamic 
movements are actively taking part in shaping the new national political landscapes that 
emerge out of more or less genuine attempts at democratization and liberalization in 
those countries. Examining the politically active Muslim minorities in Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda, Haynes remarks that despite their proximity to countries harbouring radical 
Islamists networks, in the three countries examined ‘there have been remarkably few 
examples of individual Islamic militants committing themselves to the wider cause of 
transnational Islamic militancy’. Instead, this international environment has reaffirmed 
the role of political Islam as a powerful tool of social mobilisation in those ethnically and 
confessionally divided societies. In all the cases analysed, the new political relationships 
under construction have had to cope with an ‘Islamic agenda pursued through discussion 
and negotiation’. In its turn, such an agenda bears witness to the increasing role that 
Islam plays as a political tool to activate and frame grievances and demands in the 
construction of a new institutional and legal order that will impact on all citizens, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  
The final contribution deals with the practical policy concerns that arise around 
the question of democracy, Islamism and political violence. The dramatic events that took 
place in Iraq illustrate not only how these three issues are inter-linked but also how 
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international policies have the potential to interlock them ever more strongly in a no-win 
situation. Katerina Dalacoura’s contribution addresses the issue of how far our 
understanding of both the processes of democratization and violent Islamist activism can 
operationalised in such a way that it can meaningfully inform policy-making. It notes that 
the issue of democratization in the Muslim world is at the top of the political agenda of 
most actors within the international community not only because democracy is now 
widely believed to be the best form of governance, but, possibly more importantly, 
because the very relevant problem of political violence stemming from the region is 
deeply affecting the stability and the workings of the international system. In this respect, 
the theme of Islamism comes back in the analysis because of its association with violence 
as a means to attain political objectives. While ‘all Muslims are not terrorists’, a 
significant amount of political violence that has occurred over the last two decades has 
been carried out by non-state groups in the name of Islamism. It is at this point that the 
connection is often made between the persistence of authoritarianism in most countries in 
the Muslim world and the use of violence from groups that feel excluded from the 
political system and resort to violence  to make themselves heard. Thus, a not uncommon 
belief regarding the region is that authoritarianism is not only negative because it 
impedes social and economic development, but also because it stimulates an armed 
response against incumbents who are perceived to be ruling illegitimately. 
Democratization would therefore be a magic bullet that simultaneously solves the 
domestic problem of governance and the international problem of order. However, 
Dalacoura suggests that ‘there is no evidence that a necessary causal relationship exists 
between the democratic deficit in the Middle East and the emergence of Islamist 
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terrorism.’ Following from this are  considerable policy-making implications, whereby 
democracy promotion would only be one of many tools to decrease the risks associated 
with political violence.   
 
These studies taken together allow us to better understand the problematic 
relationship that exists between Islam and democracy in the uncertain post-Cold War 
world by focusing on key issues that affect the Muslim world. Far from subscribing to the 
notion that Islam is a monolith, that it is incapable of coming to terms with the 
requirements of modernity and that democracy is also a monolith that cannot deviate 
from the Western liberal model, these analyses highlight the complexity of Islam as a 
political referent, and the institutional strategies of survival put in place by incumbent 
authoritarian elites.  
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